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Introduction 
1. The Boards of Trustees of the international centers and programs 
supported by the CGTAR are a cornerstone in the operation of the inter- 
national agricultural research effort. It is the Boards which have the 
final, legal responsibility for ensuring the scientific quality and relevance, 
managerial efficiency and financial integrity of the individual centers. 
Many of the unique strengths of the CGIAR enterprise -- the autonomy and 
independence of its constituent parts, the informality and the relatively 
non-bureaucratic, decentralized structure -- are possible largely because of 
the confidence and trust shown by the members of the Consultative Group 
in the Boards of Trustees. 
2. The current problem of allocating scarce funds in 1980 has under- 
lined a basic dilemma in the nature of the responsibilities of Center Boards 
of Trustees as presently constituted. 
3. The first responsibility of a Board of Trustees is, and must be, to 
its own center, for the Board must ensure the quality, effectiveness and sound- 
ness of that institution. Yet the center forms part of a larger enterprise, 
and what is best for an indfvidual center may not always be best for the system 
as a whole. What is the responsibility of a Board to this greater entity? 
4. For example, given its responsibility for the continued viability 
and effectiveness of its center, a Board of Trustees properly seeks to ensure 
that it will be financially secure. While a Board may appreciate the constraints 
affecting the system as a whole, and the need to carefully scrutinize each 
major item in its center's program and budget request, it may also feel that 
it is in competition for scarce funds with other centers and must therefore put 
forward its strongest case, both in its budget request and in its periodic con- 
tacts with the donor community. Similarly, in scientific management, if 
duplication or conflict arises where two or more centers are working on the same 
commodity or in the same country, a Board may give less weight to the need for 
complementarity and efficiency within the system than to what it perceives to 
be the legitimate and proper role of its own center. 
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5. The CGIAR was created for the explicit purpose of building a 
set of complementary activities filling the major gaps in agricultural 
research. The sponsors of the enterprise -- the members of the Consulta- 
tive Group -- expect the international centers and programs to share a sense 
of common responsibility. 
6. Moreover, as the CG system has grown, the members of the Group have 
become more actively concerned with setting the future balance and direction of 
the CGIAR research effort. Recent examples include the emphasis on research 
which will benefit resource-poor farmers, the decision to limit the growth of 
established centers and the desire to review and modify the research priorities 
within the network. 
Responsibility 
7. Responsibility for implementing the decisions of the Group rests 
initially with a center's Board of Trustees, which sets the policy for that 
center. How thoroughly this responsibility is exercised depends on the degree 
to which a center Board of Trustees feels responsible, and accountable, to the 
Consultative Group as a whole. There are about 150 Board members. As yet, 
there appears to be no clear consensus among them as to what obligation they 
may feel they have to carry out the decisions of the Group. Where, in fact, 
does final authority rest? 
8. The Boards of Trustees themselves are beginning to grapple with this 
question. A paper on the "Responsibilities of Trustees for International 
Agricultural Research Centers" has been prepared for discussion at a meeting ,- 
of Center Board Chairmen during Centers Week. This year's Chairman of the 
Chairmen" will be reporting to the CG meeting on the outcome of these discus- 
sions. Essentially, the paper outlines the duties and functions of Boards 
and their members, selection procedures and criteria for new members, committees, 
relationship with the Director General, and other matters important in the manage- 
ment of a center. 
9. One paragraph of the paper describes the appropriate relationship of 
the centers to the Consultative Group. It suggests there is a "delicate balance 
of power and influence between the CG, TAC and the centers" the maintenance of 
which is essential to the continued success of the system. It argues that the 
Boards must be more helpful to the Group and TAC than in the past, both in the 
coordination among centers &thin the system and in external relations with donors. 
10. In the future, competition for funds will be an inevitable feature of 
the CGIAR. As the network grows the need for effective collaboration among 
activities will become greater. Under these circumstances, the questions of 
resource allocation, research priorities and balance and the resolution of 
problems on a system-wide basis will become increasingly important. At the 
center of these questions is the role of the Boards of Trustees in the future, 
and the relationship of the individual units within the CGIAR to the network as 
a whole. 
. . t . / 
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Accountability 
11. The responsibilities of a Board of Trustees may be divided into 
four. These relate to (i) the center which it governs, (ii) the other 
centers which comprise the CG network, (iii) the developing countries which 
benefit from the center's work, and (iv) the Consultative Group which sets 
policies and provides funds for the system as a whole. 
12. As part of its first responsibility a Board is concerned with the 
quality and relevance of the center's research programs. Judging by the 
findings of TAC's Quinquennial Reviews to date, this function is being carried 
out satisfactorily. A second part of this responsibility is to oversee the 
management and financial affairs of the center. Boards have varied as to the 
importance and attention they have gfven to this function, However, there is 
a growing awareness of the need to ensure the same standards of excellence as 
in the scientific programs. 
$3. The second responsibility -- toward making the CGIAR system a genuinely 
i'ollaborative effort 
F 
-- is being given greater attention by several centers and 
i heir Boards. Collaborative agreements among several centers have been signed, 
iand cooperation in both scientific and administrative matters is increasing. 
'&he role of TAC is also becoming more important in this area, such as in the 
1 case of upland rice-research. While collaboration may still not be wholly fsatisfactory in every instance, most centers are making genuine efforts to 
"collaborate rather than compete. i 
14. The third responsibility -- to the developing countries and their 
peoples -- is common to all participants in this effort, and it is on how this 
responsibility is discharged that the centers and Consultative Group will 
eventually be judged. The growth of center off-campus programs over the 
past three years demonstrates that centers and their Boards recognize this 
responsibility and are committed to collaboration with the developing countries. 
15. If the centers and their Boards execute these first three responsibilities 
properly, they are, in fact helping to fulfill their fourth responsibility -- to 
the Consultative Group. The members of the Group share these same objectives: 
to create a collaborative network of high-quality research institutions carrying 
out research of direct relevance and value to developing countries. For the 
Group, a basic issue respecting future governance and management is the degree 
to which it should actively guide the centers in the carrying out these respon- 
sibilities. 
$6. The principal management question is whether there should be a more 
i.idirect relationship between the Boards and the Group. I 
17.. The independence and autonomy of the centers has always been one of 
the guiding principles of the Consultative Group. The international centers 
have been largely free from the political pressures which surround most publicly- 
sponsored activities. Because of the long-term nature of research they have 
also needed to be less susceptible to rapid shifts in thinking and emphasis 
sometimes characteristic of the international aid community. At the same time, 
each center must be aware of, and responsive to, the genuine concerns and interests 
of its sponsors and its beneficiaries. Independence should not be synonymous 
with isolation or insulation. If the centers are to be effective, and if the 
Group is to act wisely and responsibly, there may need to be a greater integra- 
tion of effort. The Group rnD&_to -are of the objectives and ..-. -- l... 
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- 4 - 
concerns of the centers and their Boards, while Boards of Trustees may need 
to understand and appreciate better the interests and expectations of the 
members of the Group. More explicit cooperation may be needpd if the proper 
balance between independence and accountability is to be struck. 
18. There are several steps which could be taken within the existing CGIAR 
structure to improve understanding,and cooperation between Boards of Trustees 
and the Group, and enhance the sense of participation in one another's affairs. 
An essential feature of this process would be improvements in the manner in 
which Board members are selected and prepared for service on the Board. 
19. Presently, each international center is governed by an independent 
Board of Trustees. Apart from ex officio members, such as host country repre- 
sentatives and the Director Genezl, members serve in their individual capacities. 
Most Boards are self-perpetuating, i.e. a Board itself is responsible for select- 
ing new members as vacancies occur. 
20. Since the creation of the CGIAR in 1971, the constitution of every 
new center supported by the Group (except WARDA] provides for certain members 
of the Board to be selected by the CGIAR. Typically three places are reserved 
for CGIAR-designated members, although in newer centers the number tends to be 
greater. The four oldest centers which pre-date the CGIAR have no CG-designated 
members. 
21. While certain members of Boards serve as CG designated members, they 
serve in their individual capacity. They receive no instructions or guidance 
from the Group and are under no obligation to report to it. 
22. If improved understanding and cooperation between the Group and the 
Boards of Trustees is to be sought, a number of actfons are possible. First, 
the Group could have the responsibility and the right to place on each Board 
a certain number of trustees as recommended by the CGIAR Review Committee in 
1976. While several of the four original centers have named to their Boards 
I officials of donors and have invited suggestions from CG members when considering 
I 
i 
candidates to fill vacancies, none has amended its charter or Articles to provide 
%‘! \for CG Board members. Since in their relationship to the CGIAR the older centers 
'.i 
i 
are no different from the newer ones, 
I 
it is logical and appropriate that whatever 
jarrangements are made for the CG to fill certain vacancies on Boards should be 
common to all. 
23. Second, the function of CG Board members could have more meaning and 
purpose. Currently, they have no responsibility toward the Consultative Group, 
formal or informal. They neither receive guidance from the Group nor report 
to the Group. They may be no more familiar with the Consultative Group actions 
or processes than any other Board member. To date, their designation has been 
largely symbolic. Only in their initial selection do they differ from other 
Board members. 
._ 
' 24. The participation of CG Board members could be made more purposeful 
c- and could contribute to better mutual understanding if they understood, and 
could present, the views and interests of the Group to the Boards. This would 
require greater participation by these Board members in the activities of the 
Group. To this end they could be specifically briefed on the Group's policies, 
interests and concerns and they could routinely attend CGIAR meetings. 
. . . . / 
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In this way, they would be better placed to present (but not necessarily 
represent) to the Boards the Group's concerns on important issues, and 
similarly express the views of the Boards at CG meetings when appropriate. 
25. This action could be taken without altering the current practice 
that, once selected, CG Board members serve independently and in their 
individual capacities. A different issue -- which is not addressed here -- 
is whether these members should receive more explicit guidance from the Group 
on issues peculiar to the center on whose Board they serve. 
26. m the continued vitality and proper functioning of Boards 
depends in large part on the quality of members who serve. The members of 
the CGIAR represent a broad spectrum of governments, foundations and inter- 
national organizations with contacts throughout the world's scientific 
management and aid communities. The pool of highly qualified candidates for 
Board membership has not yet been adequately tapped. The present processes 
for identifying and assessing possible candidates could be improved. A more 
systematic and comprehensive process of seeking and evaluating candidates 
should be developed. Indeed, the sense of mutual responsibility between the 
Group and the centers might be enhanced if donors were more actively involved 
in the selection process. 
27. While the role of the Boards of Trustees and the mutual responsibility 
and acco'untability of the constituent parts of the Consultative Group are not 
pressing issues at this time, they are bound to become more important as the 
system develops and expands. The principles and mechanisms which have guided 
it in the past will need to be reviewed to ensure that they are still adequate 
to deal with a larger and more complex institution. The structure of the 
governance and management of the CGIAR and the network it supports ought to 
be reviewed systematically. 
28. The 1979 Integrattve Report suggests that the Group undertake the 
second review of the function of the system in 1981. These questions could 
be specifically addressed in the course of the review. 
29. The views of the members of the Group on the issues raised above 
would be a useful beginning to the process of reviewing the management of the 
Group. The Group may also wish to discuss whether any of the possible actions 
suggested merit further consideration and might be initiated prior to a full-scale 
review (which would not be completed until the end of 1981 at the earliest). 
If desired, 'the Secretariat could prepare specific proposals regarding the 
selection, appointment and orientation of CG Board members. These proposals 
could be considered at the next meeting of the Consultative Group. 
